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index 8a0a6741fd664f98f2883348c0a755d60616035b..b6f71d1086981dc41bdbbc8954eccd9e9b719f98 100644 (file)
--- a/path.c
+++ b/path.c
* which is what it's designed for.
*/
#include "cache.h"
+#include "strbuf.h"
static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
return cleanup_path(pathname);
}
-
-/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
-int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
+char *git_path_submodule(const char *path, const char *fmt, ...)
{
- const char *tmp;
- size_t n;
-
- tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
- if (!tmp)
- tmp = "/tmp";
- n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
- if (len <= n) {
- errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
- return -1;
+ char *pathname = get_pathname();
+ struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
+ const char *git_dir;
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ len = strlen(path);
+ if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
+ return bad_path;
+
+ strbuf_addstr(&buf, path);
+ if (len && path[len-1] != '/')
+ strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
+ strbuf_addstr(&buf, ".git");
+
+ git_dir = read_gitfile(buf.buf);
+ if (git_dir) {
+ strbuf_reset(&buf);
+ strbuf_addstr(&buf, git_dir);
}
- return mkstemp(path);
-}
+ strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
+
+ if (buf.len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return bad_path;
+ memcpy(pathname, buf.buf, buf.len + 1);
+ strbuf_release(&buf);
+ len = strlen(pathname);
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= PATH_MAX)
+ return bad_path;
+ return cleanup_path(pathname);
+}
int validate_headref(const char *path)
{
return -1;
}
-static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
+static struct passwd *getpw_str(const char *username, size_t len)
{
struct passwd *pw;
- char *slash;
- int len, baselen;
+ char *username_z = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ memcpy(username_z, username, len);
+ username_z[len] = '\0';
+ pw = getpwnam(username_z);
+ free(username_z);
+ return pw;
+}
- if (!path || path[0] != '~')
- return NULL;
- path++;
- slash = strchr(path, '/');
- if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
- pw = getpwuid(getuid());
- }
- else {
- if (slash) {
- *slash = 0;
- pw = getpwnam(path);
- *slash = '/';
+/*
+ * Return a string with ~ and ~user expanded via getpw*. If buf != NULL,
+ * then it is a newly allocated string. Returns NULL on getpw failure or
+ * if path is NULL.
+ */
+char *expand_user_path(const char *path)
+{
+ struct strbuf user_path = STRBUF_INIT;
+ const char *first_slash = strchrnul(path, '/');
+ const char *to_copy = path;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ goto return_null;
+ if (path[0] == '~') {
+ const char *username = path + 1;
+ size_t username_len = first_slash - username;
+ if (username_len == 0) {
+ const char *home = getenv("HOME");
+ if (!home)
+ goto return_null;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home));
+ } else {
+ struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len);
+ if (!pw)
+ goto return_null;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
}
- else
- pw = getpwnam(path);
- }
- if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
- return NULL;
- baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
- memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
- while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
- buf[baselen-1] = 0;
- baselen--;
- }
- if (slash && slash[1]) {
- len = strlen(slash);
- if (sz <= baselen + len)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
+ to_copy = first_slash;
}
- return buf;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, to_copy, strlen(to_copy));
+ return strbuf_detach(&user_path, NULL);
+return_null:
+ strbuf_release(&user_path);
+ return NULL;
}
/*
* links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
* except DWIM suffixing.
*/
-char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
+const char *enter_repo(const char *path, int strict)
{
static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
static const char *suffix[] = {
".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
};
+ const char *gitfile;
int len = strlen(path);
int i;
- while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
- path[len-1] = 0;
+ while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/'))
len--;
- }
+
if (PATH_MAX <= len)
return NULL;
- if (path[0] == '~') {
- if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
+ strncpy(used_path, path, len); used_path[len] = 0 ;
+ strcpy(validated_path, used_path);
+
+ if (used_path[0] == '~') {
+ char *newpath = expand_user_path(used_path);
+ if (!newpath || (PATH_MAX - 10 < strlen(newpath))) {
+ free(newpath);
return NULL;
- strcpy(validated_path, path);
- path = used_path;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Copy back into the static buffer. A pity
+ * since newpath was not bounded, but other
+ * branches of the if are limited by PATH_MAX
+ * anyway.
+ */
+ strcpy(used_path, newpath); free(newpath);
}
else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
return NULL;
- else {
- path = strcpy(used_path, path);
- strcpy(validated_path, path);
- }
- len = strlen(path);
+ len = strlen(used_path);
for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
- strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
- if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
+ strcpy(used_path + len, suffix[i]);
+ if (!access(used_path, F_OK)) {
strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
break;
}
}
- if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
+ if (!suffix[i])
+ return NULL;
+ gitfile = read_gitfile(used_path) ;
+ if (gitfile)
+ strcpy(used_path, gitfile);
+ if (chdir(used_path))
return NULL;
path = validated_path;
}
if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
- setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1);
+ set_git_dir(".");
check_repository_format();
return path;
}
return 0;
}
-const char *make_relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base)
+const char *relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base)
{
static char buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
- int baselen;
- if (!base)
- return abs;
- baselen = strlen(base);
- if (prefixcmp(abs, base))
+ int i = 0, j = 0;
+
+ if (!base || !base[0])
return abs;
- if (abs[baselen] == '/')
- baselen++;
- else if (base[baselen - 1] != '/')
+ while (base[i]) {
+ if (is_dir_sep(base[i])) {
+ if (!is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ return abs;
+ while (is_dir_sep(base[i]))
+ i++;
+ while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ j++;
+ continue;
+ } else if (abs[j] != base[i]) {
+ return abs;
+ }
+ i++;
+ j++;
+ }
+ if (
+ /* "/foo" is a prefix of "/foo" */
+ abs[j] &&
+ /* "/foo" is not a prefix of "/foobar" */
+ !is_dir_sep(base[i-1]) && !is_dir_sep(abs[j])
+ )
return abs;
- strcpy(buf, abs + baselen);
+ while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ j++;
+ if (!abs[j])
+ strcpy(buf, ".");
+ else
+ strcpy(buf, abs + j);
return buf;
}
return NULL;
return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len));
}
+
+int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
+{
+ int sl, ndot;
+
+ /*
+ * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
+ * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
+ * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization.
+ *
+ * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
+ * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
+ * non-dot character.
+ */
+ if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
+ return -1;
+ sl = 1; ndot = 0;
+ p++;
+
+ while (1) {
+ char ch = *p++;
+ if (sl) {
+ if (ch == '.')
+ ndot++;
+ else if (ch == '/') {
+ if (ndot < 3)
+ /* reject //, /./ and /../ */
+ return -1;
+ ndot = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch == 0) {
+ if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
+ /* reject /.$ and /..$ */
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ sl = ndot = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ch == '/') {
+ sl = 1;
+ ndot = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int offset_1st_component(const char *path)
+{
+ if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))
+ return 2 + is_dir_sep(path[2]);
+ return is_dir_sep(path[0]);
+}