From 50d0158fbba5c4cd04184bb757bf43a84c290405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff King Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2011 05:40:45 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] imap-send: avoid buffer overflow We format the password prompt in an 80-character static buffer. It contains the remote host and username, so it's unlikely to overflow (or be exploitable by a remote attacker), but there's no reason not to be careful and use a strbuf. Signed-off-by: Jeff King Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- imap-send.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/imap-send.c b/imap-send.c index e1ad1a48c..4c1e89711 100644 --- a/imap-send.c +++ b/imap-send.c @@ -1209,9 +1209,10 @@ static struct store *imap_open_store(struct imap_server_conf *srvc) goto bail; } if (!srvc->pass) { - char prompt[80]; - sprintf(prompt, "Password (%s@%s): ", srvc->user, srvc->host); - arg = git_getpass(prompt); + struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT; + strbuf_addf(&prompt, "Password (%s@%s): ", srvc->user, srvc->host); + arg = git_getpass(prompt.buf); + strbuf_release(&prompt); if (!arg) { perror("getpass"); exit(1); -- 2.30.2