From 34b6cb8bb032bd16f3d1c93a8417beb75e51ed29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Shawn O. Pearce" Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2009 11:26:43 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] http-backend: Protect GIT_PROJECT_ROOT from /../ requests Eons ago HPA taught git-daemon how to protect itself from /../ attacks, which Junio brought back into service in d79374c7b58d ("daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation"). I did not carry this into git-http-backend as originally we relied only upon PATH_TRANSLATED, and assumed the HTTP server had done its access control checks to validate the resolved path was within a directory permitting access from the remote client. This would usually be sufficient to protect a server from requests for its /etc/passwd file by http://host/smart/../etc/passwd sorts of URLs. However in 917adc036086 Mark Lodato added GIT_PROJECT_ROOT as an additional method of configuring the CGI. When this environment variable is used the web server does not generate the final access path and therefore may blindly pass through "/../etc/passwd" in PATH_INFO under the assumption that "/../" might have special meaning to the invoked CGI. Instead of permitting these sorts of malformed path requests, we now reject them back at the client, with an error message for the server log. This matches git-daemon behavior. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano --- cache.h | 1 + daemon.c | 49 +---------------------------------------- http-backend.c | 6 +++++ path.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ t/t5560-http-backend.sh | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/cache.h b/cache.h index 4e283be24..ecbd88adb 100644 --- a/cache.h +++ b/cache.h @@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ const char *make_relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base); int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src); int longest_ancestor_length(const char *path, const char *prefix_list); char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix); +int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *path); /* Read and unpack a sha1 file into memory, write memory to a sha1 file */ extern int sha1_object_info(const unsigned char *, unsigned long *); diff --git a/daemon.c b/daemon.c index 1b5ada664..ce4800621 100644 --- a/daemon.c +++ b/daemon.c @@ -101,53 +101,6 @@ static void NORETURN daemon_die(const char *err, va_list params) exit(1); } -static int avoid_alias(char *p) -{ - int sl, ndot; - - /* - * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA - * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo() - * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations. - * - * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to - * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening - * non-dot character. - */ - if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~')) - return -1; - sl = 1; ndot = 0; - p++; - - while (1) { - char ch = *p++; - if (sl) { - if (ch == '.') - ndot++; - else if (ch == '/') { - if (ndot < 3) - /* reject //, /./ and /../ */ - return -1; - ndot = 0; - } - else if (ch == 0) { - if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3) - /* reject /.$ and /..$ */ - return -1; - return 0; - } - else - sl = ndot = 0; - } - else if (ch == 0) - return 0; - else if (ch == '/') { - sl = 1; - ndot = 0; - } - } -} - static char *path_ok(char *directory) { static char rpath[PATH_MAX]; @@ -157,7 +110,7 @@ static char *path_ok(char *directory) dir = directory; - if (avoid_alias(dir)) { + if (daemon_avoid_alias(dir)) { logerror("'%s': aliased", dir); return NULL; } diff --git a/http-backend.c b/http-backend.c index 646e9108b..f8ea9d7fa 100644 --- a/http-backend.c +++ b/http-backend.c @@ -559,7 +559,13 @@ static char* getdir(void) if (root && *root) { if (!pathinfo || !*pathinfo) die("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT is set but PATH_INFO is not"); + if (daemon_avoid_alias(pathinfo)) + die("'%s': aliased", pathinfo); strbuf_addstr(&buf, root); + if (buf.buf[buf.len - 1] != '/') + strbuf_addch(&buf, '/'); + if (pathinfo[0] == '/') + pathinfo++; strbuf_addstr(&buf, pathinfo); return strbuf_detach(&buf, NULL); } else if (path && *path) { diff --git a/path.c b/path.c index 047fdb0a1..c7679be5c 100644 --- a/path.c +++ b/path.c @@ -564,3 +564,50 @@ char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix) return NULL; return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len)); } + +int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p) +{ + int sl, ndot; + + /* + * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA + * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo() + * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations. + * + * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to + * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening + * non-dot character. + */ + if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~')) + return -1; + sl = 1; ndot = 0; + p++; + + while (1) { + char ch = *p++; + if (sl) { + if (ch == '.') + ndot++; + else if (ch == '/') { + if (ndot < 3) + /* reject //, /./ and /../ */ + return -1; + ndot = 0; + } + else if (ch == 0) { + if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3) + /* reject /.$ and /..$ */ + return -1; + return 0; + } + else + sl = ndot = 0; + } + else if (ch == 0) + return 0; + else if (ch == '/') { + sl = 1; + ndot = 0; + } + } +} diff --git a/t/t5560-http-backend.sh b/t/t5560-http-backend.sh index 908ba079d..ed034bc98 100755 --- a/t/t5560-http-backend.sh +++ b/t/t5560-http-backend.sh @@ -146,6 +146,37 @@ test_expect_success 'http.receivepack false' ' POST git-receive-pack 0000 "403 Forbidden" ' +run_backend() { + REQUEST_METHOD=GET \ + GIT_PROJECT_ROOT="$HTTPD_DOCUMENT_ROOT_PATH" \ + PATH_INFO="$2" \ + git http-backend >act.out 2>act.err +} + +path_info() { + if test $1 = 0; then + run_backend "$2" + else + test_must_fail run_backend "$2" && + echo "fatal: '$2': aliased" >exp.err && + test_cmp exp.err act.err + fi +} + +test_expect_success 'http-backend blocks bad PATH_INFO' ' + config http.getanyfile true && + + run_backend 0 /repo.git/HEAD && + + run_backend 1 /repo.git/../HEAD && + run_backend 1 /../etc/passwd && + run_backend 1 ../etc/passwd && + run_backend 1 /etc//passwd && + run_backend 1 /etc/./passwd && + run_backend 1 /etc/.../passwd && + run_backend 1 //domain/data.txt +' + cat >exp <