daemon: further tweaks.

 - Do validation only on canonicalized paths
 - Run upload-pack with "." as repository argument

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>

diff --git a/Documentation/git-daemon.txt b/Documentation/git-daemon.txt
index 972e0e1571391efb6041f0e7bff5df18fb1a4eaf..2a8f371ec95b619bcfb3fc289770ab7ef929214d 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/git-daemon.txt
+++ b/Documentation/git-daemon.txt
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ git-daemon - A really simple server for git repositories.
 SYNOPSIS
 --------
 'git-daemon' [--verbose] [--syslog] [--inetd | --port=n] [--export-all]
-             [--timeout=n] [--init-timeout=n] [directory...]
+             [--timeout=n] [--init-timeout=n] [--strict-paths] [directory...]
 
 DESCRIPTION
 -----------
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ This is ideally suited for read-only updates, ie pulling from git repositories.
 
 OPTIONS
 -------
-+--strict-paths::
+--strict-paths::
        Match paths exactly (i.e. don't allow "/foo/repo" when the real path is
        "/foo/repo.git" or "/foo/repo/.git") and don't do user-relative paths.
        git-daemon will refuse to start when this option is enabled and no

diff --git a/daemon.c b/daemon.c
index ac4c94bc709350471d66180d427a7e5df91c6235..d788167ae0bbce0995329e0263e7082513087441 100644 (file)
--- a/daemon.c
+++ b/daemon.c
@@ -92,25 +92,21 @@ static char *path_ok(char *dir)
        }
 
        if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
-               char **pp = NULL;
-               int dirlen = strlen(dir);
+               char **pp;
                int pathlen = strlen(path);
 
+               /* The validation is done on the paths after enter_repo
+                * canonicalization, so whitelist should be written in
+                * terms of real pathnames (i.e. after ~user is expanded
+                * and symlinks resolved).
+                */
                for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
                        int len = strlen(*pp);
-                       /* because of symlinks we must match both what the
-                        * user passed and the canonicalized path, otherwise
-                        * the user can send a string matching either a whitelist
-                        * entry or an actual directory exactly and still not
-                        * get through */
-                       if (len <= pathlen && !memcmp(*pp, path, len)) {
-                               if (path[len] == '\0' || (!strict_paths && path[len] == '/'))
-                                       return path;
-                       }
-                       if (len <= dirlen && !memcmp(*pp, dir, len)) {
-                               if (dir[len] == '\0' || (!strict_paths && dir[len] == '/'))
-                                       return path;
-                       }
+                       if (len <= pathlen &&
+                           !memcmp(*pp, path, len) &&
+                           (path[len] == '\0' ||
+                            (!strict_paths && path[len] == '/')))
+                               return path;
                }
        }
        else {
@@ -160,7 +156,7 @@ static int upload(char *dir)
        snprintf(timeout_buf, sizeof timeout_buf, "--timeout=%u", timeout);
 
        /* git-upload-pack only ever reads stuff, so this is safe */
-       execlp("git-upload-pack", "git-upload-pack", "--strict", timeout_buf, path, NULL);
+       execlp("git-upload-pack", "git-upload-pack", "--strict", timeout_buf, ".", NULL);
        return -1;
 }