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index 4b9107fed10c1f3551acf1f14d2ba5d1ba8a0b84..d1fccbde7f5ba08ba9876b12e1dbabf87f44b4e9 100644 (file)
--- a/path.c
+++ b/path.c
* which is what it's designed for.
*/
#include "cache.h"
+#include "strbuf.h"
static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
return mkstemp(path);
}
+/* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */
+int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len)
+{
+ const char *tmp;
+ size_t n;
+
+ tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
+ if (!tmp)
+ tmp = "/tmp";
+ n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
+ if (len <= n) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return mkstemps(path, suffix_len);
+}
int validate_headref(const char *path)
{
return -1;
}
-static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
+static struct passwd *getpw_str(const char *username, size_t len)
{
struct passwd *pw;
- char *slash;
- int len, baselen;
+ char *username_z = xmalloc(len + 1);
+ memcpy(username_z, username, len);
+ username_z[len] = '\0';
+ pw = getpwnam(username_z);
+ free(username_z);
+ return pw;
+}
- if (!path || path[0] != '~')
- return NULL;
- path++;
- slash = strchr(path, '/');
- if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
- pw = getpwuid(getuid());
- }
- else {
- if (slash) {
- *slash = 0;
- pw = getpwnam(path);
- *slash = '/';
+/*
+ * Return a string with ~ and ~user expanded via getpw*. If buf != NULL,
+ * then it is a newly allocated string. Returns NULL on getpw failure or
+ * if path is NULL.
+ */
+char *expand_user_path(const char *path)
+{
+ struct strbuf user_path = STRBUF_INIT;
+ const char *first_slash = strchrnul(path, '/');
+ const char *to_copy = path;
+
+ if (path == NULL)
+ goto return_null;
+ if (path[0] == '~') {
+ const char *username = path + 1;
+ size_t username_len = first_slash - username;
+ if (username_len == 0) {
+ const char *home = getenv("HOME");
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, home, strlen(home));
+ } else {
+ struct passwd *pw = getpw_str(username, username_len);
+ if (!pw)
+ goto return_null;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
}
- else
- pw = getpwnam(path);
- }
- if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
- return NULL;
- baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
- memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
- while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
- buf[baselen-1] = 0;
- baselen--;
- }
- if (slash && slash[1]) {
- len = strlen(slash);
- if (sz <= baselen + len)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
+ to_copy = first_slash;
}
- return buf;
+ strbuf_add(&user_path, to_copy, strlen(to_copy));
+ return strbuf_detach(&user_path, NULL);
+return_null:
+ strbuf_release(&user_path);
+ return NULL;
}
/*
if (PATH_MAX <= len)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '~') {
- if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
+ char *newpath = expand_user_path(path);
+ if (!newpath || (PATH_MAX - 10 < strlen(newpath))) {
+ free(newpath);
return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Copy back into the static buffer. A pity
+ * since newpath was not bounded, but other
+ * branches of the if are limited by PATH_MAX
+ * anyway.
+ */
+ strcpy(used_path, newpath); free(newpath);
strcpy(validated_path, path);
path = used_path;
}
if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
- setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1);
+ set_git_dir(".");
check_repository_format();
return path;
}
return NULL;
}
-int adjust_shared_perm(const char *path)
+int set_shared_perm(const char *path, int mode)
{
struct stat st;
- int mode;
+ int tweak, shared, orig_mode;
- if (!shared_repository)
+ if (!shared_repository) {
+ if (mode)
+ return chmod(path, mode & ~S_IFMT);
return 0;
- if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
- return -1;
- mode = st.st_mode;
-
- if (shared_repository) {
- int tweak = shared_repository;
- if (!(mode & S_IWUSR))
- tweak &= ~0222;
- mode |= tweak;
- } else {
- /* Preserve old PERM_UMASK behaviour */
- if (mode & S_IWUSR)
- mode |= S_IWGRP;
}
+ if (!mode) {
+ if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ mode = st.st_mode;
+ orig_mode = mode;
+ } else
+ orig_mode = 0;
+ if (shared_repository < 0)
+ shared = -shared_repository;
+ else
+ shared = shared_repository;
+ tweak = shared;
+
+ if (!(mode & S_IWUSR))
+ tweak &= ~0222;
+ if (mode & S_IXUSR)
+ /* Copy read bits to execute bits */
+ tweak |= (tweak & 0444) >> 2;
+ if (shared_repository < 0)
+ mode = (mode & ~0777) | tweak;
+ else
+ mode |= tweak;
if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
- mode |= FORCE_DIR_SET_GID;
-
/* Copy read bits to execute bits */
- mode |= (shared_repository & 0444) >> 2;
+ mode |= (shared & 0444) >> 2;
+ mode |= FORCE_DIR_SET_GID;
}
- if ((mode & st.st_mode) != mode && chmod(path, mode) < 0)
+ if (((shared_repository < 0
+ ? (orig_mode & (FORCE_DIR_SET_GID | 0777))
+ : (orig_mode & mode)) != mode) &&
+ chmod(path, (mode & ~S_IFMT)) < 0)
return -2;
return 0;
}
const char *make_relative_path(const char *abs, const char *base)
{
static char buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
- int baselen;
- if (!base)
- return abs;
- baselen = strlen(base);
- if (prefixcmp(abs, base))
+ int i = 0, j = 0;
+
+ if (!base || !base[0])
return abs;
- if (abs[baselen] == '/')
- baselen++;
- else if (base[baselen - 1] != '/')
+ while (base[i]) {
+ if (is_dir_sep(base[i])) {
+ if (!is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ return abs;
+ while (is_dir_sep(base[i]))
+ i++;
+ while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ j++;
+ continue;
+ } else if (abs[j] != base[i]) {
+ return abs;
+ }
+ i++;
+ j++;
+ }
+ if (
+ /* "/foo" is a prefix of "/foo" */
+ abs[j] &&
+ /* "/foo" is not a prefix of "/foobar" */
+ !is_dir_sep(base[i-1]) && !is_dir_sep(abs[j])
+ )
return abs;
- strcpy(buf, abs + baselen);
+ while (is_dir_sep(abs[j]))
+ j++;
+ if (!abs[j])
+ strcpy(buf, ".");
+ else
+ strcpy(buf, abs + j);
return buf;
}
return max_len;
}
+
+/* strip arbitrary amount of directory separators at end of path */
+static inline int chomp_trailing_dir_sep(const char *path, int len)
+{
+ while (len && is_dir_sep(path[len - 1]))
+ len--;
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If path ends with suffix (complete path components), returns the
+ * part before suffix (sans trailing directory separators).
+ * Otherwise returns NULL.
+ */
+char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix)
+{
+ int path_len = strlen(path), suffix_len = strlen(suffix);
+
+ while (suffix_len) {
+ if (!path_len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (is_dir_sep(path[path_len - 1])) {
+ if (!is_dir_sep(suffix[suffix_len - 1]))
+ return NULL;
+ path_len = chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len);
+ suffix_len = chomp_trailing_dir_sep(suffix, suffix_len);
+ }
+ else if (path[--path_len] != suffix[--suffix_len])
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (path_len && !is_dir_sep(path[path_len - 1]))
+ return NULL;
+ return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len));
+}
+
+int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
+{
+ int sl, ndot;
+
+ /*
+ * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
+ * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
+ * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalization.
+ *
+ * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
+ * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
+ * non-dot character.
+ */
+ if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
+ return -1;
+ sl = 1; ndot = 0;
+ p++;
+
+ while (1) {
+ char ch = *p++;
+ if (sl) {
+ if (ch == '.')
+ ndot++;
+ else if (ch == '/') {
+ if (ndot < 3)
+ /* reject //, /./ and /../ */
+ return -1;
+ ndot = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch == 0) {
+ if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
+ /* reject /.$ and /..$ */
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ sl = ndot = 0;
+ }
+ else if (ch == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ch == '/') {
+ sl = 1;
+ ndot = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}