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index f788028a63dbd9b34563d2589697f4b5d65b8648..42609524a55ad017557d48bedf26906cc4405d0a 100644 (file)
--- a/path.c
+++ b/path.c
*/
#include "cache.h"
-static char pathname[PATH_MAX];
static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
+static char *get_pathname(void)
+{
+ static char pathname_array[4][PATH_MAX];
+ static int index;
+ return pathname_array[3 & ++index];
+}
+
static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
{
/* Clean it up */
{
va_list args;
unsigned len;
+ char *pathname = get_pathname();
va_start(args, fmt);
len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
{
- const char *git_dir;
+ const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
+ char *pathname = get_pathname();
va_list args;
unsigned len;
- git_dir = getenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT);
- if (!git_dir) git_dir = DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT;
len = strlen(git_dir);
if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
return bad_path;
/* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
{
- char *env, *pch = path;
+ const char *tmp;
+ size_t n;
+
+ tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
+ if (!tmp)
+ tmp = "/tmp";
+ n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
+ if (len <= n) {
+ errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return mkstemp(path);
+}
+
+
+int validate_headref(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char *buf, buffer[256];
+ unsigned char sha1[20];
+ int len, fd;
- if ((env = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL) {
- strcpy(pch, "/tmp/");
- len -= 5;
- pch += 5;
- } else {
- size_t n = snprintf(pch, len, "%s/", env);
+ if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return -1;
- len -= n;
- pch += n;
+ /* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
+ if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
+ len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
+ if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
+ return 0;
+ return -1;
}
- safe_strncpy(pch, template, len);
+ /*
+ * Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
+ */
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -1;
+ len = read_in_full(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
+ close(fd);
- return mkstemp(path);
+ /*
+ * Is it a symbolic ref?
+ */
+ if (len < 4)
+ return -1;
+ if (!memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4)) {
+ buf = buffer + 4;
+ len -= 4;
+ while (len && isspace(*buf))
+ buf++, len--;
+ if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Is this a detached HEAD?
+ */
+ if (!get_sha1_hex(buffer, sha1))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -1;
}
+static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ char *slash;
+ int len, baselen;
+
+ if (!path || path[0] != '~')
+ return NULL;
+ path++;
+ slash = strchr(path, '/');
+ if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
+ pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+ }
+ else {
+ if (slash) {
+ *slash = 0;
+ pw = getpwnam(path);
+ *slash = '/';
+ }
+ else
+ pw = getpwnam(path);
+ }
+ if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
+ return NULL;
+ baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
+ memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
+ while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
+ buf[baselen-1] = 0;
+ baselen--;
+ }
+ if (slash && slash[1]) {
+ len = strlen(slash);
+ if (sz <= baselen + len)
+ return NULL;
+ memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
+ }
+ return buf;
+}
-char *safe_strncpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n)
+/*
+ * First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
+ *
+ * (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
+ * done. Otherwise:
+ * (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
+ * (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
+ * (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
+ * (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
+ *
+ * Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
+ * "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order. The first one that exists is
+ * what we try.
+ *
+ * Second, we try chdir() to that. Upon failure, we return NULL.
+ *
+ * Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
+ * Upon failure, we return NULL.
+ *
+ * If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
+ * before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
+ * links. User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
+ * except DWIM suffixing.
+ */
+char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
+{
+ static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
+ static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
+
+ if (!path)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!strict) {
+ static const char *suffix[] = {
+ ".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
+ };
+ int len = strlen(path);
+ int i;
+ while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
+ path[len-1] = 0;
+ len--;
+ }
+ if (PATH_MAX <= len)
+ return NULL;
+ if (path[0] == '~') {
+ if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
+ return NULL;
+ strcpy(validated_path, path);
+ path = used_path;
+ }
+ else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
+ return NULL;
+ else {
+ path = strcpy(used_path, path);
+ strcpy(validated_path, path);
+ }
+ len = strlen(path);
+ for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
+ strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
+ if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
+ strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
+ return NULL;
+ path = validated_path;
+ }
+ else if (chdir(path))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
+ validate_headref("HEAD") == 0) {
+ setenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT, ".", 1);
+ check_repository_format();
+ return path;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int adjust_shared_perm(const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ int mode;
+
+ if (!shared_repository)
+ return 0;
+ if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ mode = st.st_mode;
+ if (mode & S_IRUSR)
+ mode |= (shared_repository == PERM_GROUP
+ ? S_IRGRP
+ : (shared_repository == PERM_EVERYBODY
+ ? (S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)
+ : 0));
+
+ if (mode & S_IWUSR)
+ mode |= S_IWGRP;
+
+ if (mode & S_IXUSR)
+ mode |= (shared_repository == PERM_GROUP
+ ? S_IXGRP
+ : (shared_repository == PERM_EVERYBODY
+ ? (S_IXGRP|S_IXOTH)
+ : 0));
+ if (S_ISDIR(mode))
+ mode |= S_ISGID;
+ if ((mode & st.st_mode) != mode && chmod(path, mode) < 0)
+ return -2;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* We allow "recursive" symbolic links. Only within reason, though. */
+#define MAXDEPTH 5
+
+const char *make_absolute_path(const char *path)
{
- strncpy(dest, src, n);
- dest[n - 1] = '\0';
+ static char bufs[2][PATH_MAX + 1], *buf = bufs[0], *next_buf = bufs[1];
+ char cwd[1024] = "";
+ int buf_index = 1, len;
+
+ int depth = MAXDEPTH;
+ char *last_elem = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (strlcpy(buf, path, PATH_MAX) >= PATH_MAX)
+ die ("Too long path: %.*s", 60, path);
+
+ while (depth--) {
+ if (stat(buf, &st) || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+ char *last_slash = strrchr(buf, '/');
+ if (last_slash) {
+ *last_slash = '\0';
+ last_elem = xstrdup(last_slash + 1);
+ } else
+ last_elem = xstrdup(buf);
+ }
+
+ if (*buf) {
+ if (!*cwd && !getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)))
+ die ("Could not get current working directory");
+
+ if (chdir(buf))
+ die ("Could not switch to '%s'", buf);
+ }
+ if (!getcwd(buf, PATH_MAX))
+ die ("Could not get current working directory");
+
+ if (last_elem) {
+ int len = strlen(buf);
+ if (len + strlen(last_elem) + 2 > PATH_MAX)
+ die ("Too long path name: '%s/%s'",
+ buf, last_elem);
+ buf[len] = '/';
+ strcpy(buf + len + 1, last_elem);
+ free(last_elem);
+ last_elem = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!lstat(buf, &st) && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
+ len = readlink(buf, next_buf, PATH_MAX);
+ if (len < 0)
+ die ("Invalid symlink: %s", buf);
+ next_buf[len] = '\0';
+ buf = next_buf;
+ buf_index = 1 - buf_index;
+ next_buf = bufs[buf_index];
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (*cwd && chdir(cwd))
+ die ("Could not change back to '%s'", cwd);
- return dest;
+ return buf;
}